Mrs Mo, a flat owner, commissioned an estate agency as the sole agent for the sale of a shop premises priced at $13.6 million. The company assigned Anna and Bill to take care of the matter.

One day, Anna found a buyer who offered to buy the premises for $14 million. As Anna could not reach Mrs Mo at that moment and had to leave office for an urgent meeting, she asked Bill to contact Mrs Mo. When Bill contacted Mrs Mo, he told her that a buyer had offered $12.8 million for the premises. Bill eventually persuaded Mrs Mo to accept the offer and sign a provisional sale and purchase agreement.

The next day, Bill told Anna that the shop premises had been sold to his client Mr Sung who was willing to re-sell the premises to Anna’s original buyer as a confirmor. Sensing something was suspicious, Anna reported to her supervisor that Bill might have breached the company’s code of practice by showing favour to Mr Sung to sell him the premises at a lower price.

While the estate agency conducted an internal investigation, Bill begged Anna to falsely claim that she had only met the original buyer who made the $14 million offer after the provisional sale and purchase agreement had been signed. Anna immediately refused.

In fact, the whole situation happened because Bill did not want to share the commission equally with Anna. Instead of co-operating with Anna, he wanted to handle the transaction alone. He thus sought assistance from his friend Mr Sung in buying the shop at a lower price and then re-selling it as a confirmor to Anna’s original buyer at a higher price. Through this way, Bill not only could receive more than $50,000 commission from both the buyer and seller, he could also share the profits from the price difference with Mr Sung. The estate agency refused to pay Bill the commission and reported the situation to the ICAC.

Director Mr Lai was a village-type house developer and a director of an estate agency. His agency had acquired a land lot in the New Territories for constructing village-type houses.

Mr Lai assigned the project to his assistant Clement who held an estate agent’s licence. Clement knew Mr Shum who claimed himself a village representative. They often gambled together and Clement ended up owing money to Mr Shum. When Clement failed to make a repayment, Mr Shum asked Clement to deceive Mr Lai by making use of Mr Lai’s eagerness to get the project underway so that Clement could repay the debts. Clement felt he had no alternative but to do as Mr Shum instructed.  One day, Clement told Mr Lai that Mr Shum, the village representative, had asked the company to donate $500,000 to the village fund. Otherwise, the village residents would object the coming village-type house construction project. To avoid complications, Mr Lai made a cheque to Mr Shum and Clement returned a false receipt on Mr Shum’s behalf.  

Later, Mr Lai suspected that corruption might be involved in the incident and reported it to the ICAC.  After investigation, it was found that Mr Shum was not a real village representative, but only an ordinary villager.

Ronald worked in an estate agency. His employer trusted him and provided him with training; yet Ronald felt he could have done better. Ronald planned to marry his girlfriend in a year’s time. To prepare for the costly wedding, he applied for a huge loan from a finance company, putting himself in a position where he had to work very hard to repay the debt. After successfully renting out Ms Yeung’s flat at $30,000 per month, Ronald asked Ms Yeung to deposit the $15,000 commission into the bank account of a consultancy firm which was set up by himself. Ronald also lied about the consultancy firm being a subsidiary of the estate agency which he worked for. To conceal the whereabouts of the commission, Ronald submitted a false report to his employer stating that Ms Yeung’s tenancy transaction had been facilitated by a consultancy firm and Ms Yeung would only be willing to pay commission to the consultancy firm. Ronald’s employer was suspicious about these arrangements and checked the consultancy firm’s details. Ronald’s dishonest act was revealed and a report was made to the ICAC.

Gordon was an estate agent in an estate agency.  Mr Yu, a client, commissioned Gordon to sell four commercial units, specifying a minimum average price of $20,000 per square foot. As Gordon knew his cousin Johnny planned to invest in commercial buildings in that district, he recommended Mr Yu’s units and sold two of them to Johnny at around $18,000 per square foot. To thank Gordon, Johnny offered him “tea money” of $150,000. Gordon then found another buyer, Mr Pau, for the remaining two units, asking $24,000 per square foot in order to fulfil Mr Yu’s price instructions. After several negotiations, the transaction was concluded at $22,000 per square foot. Although Gordon succeeded in selling Mr Yu’s units at an average price of $20,000 per square foot, Mr Yu suspected that Gordon had favoured Johnny and corruption was involved. He therefore reported the case to the ICAC. Gordon argued in court that the transaction had been concluded according to Mr Yu’s wishes and neither the estate agency nor Mr Yu had suffered any loss. However, the estate agency employing Gordon had stipulated that no agent was allowed to accept any private advantage from clients. The seller Mr Yu was also dissatisfied with Gordon’s behaviour.

Vincent, an estate agent of an agency, facilitated the sale of Mr Leung’s flat to Mrs Pong at a price of $34 million. In line with regular practice, both buyer and seller had to pay 1% of the purchase price as commission to the agency. After the transaction was completed, Vincent showed an agreement and a fax to Mr Leung and Mrs Pong. The agreement indicated that the transaction had been carried out through two estate agencies, Vincent’s agency and Agency B. The fax was issued by Vincent’s agency and indicated that Agency B would collect the commission on its behalf. As the agreement and fax bore the signatures of the persons responsible in both estate agencies as well as company chops, Mr Leung and Mrs Pong paid the commission accordingly. In fact, Vincent had forged the agreement and fax document with a view to embezzling his employer’s commission using Agency B’s account. Agency B was later to return 80% of the commission it received to Vincent. Meanwhile, Vincent told his employer that another estate agency had beaten him to the transaction. Vincent’s agency made a report to the ICAC after suspecting that Vincent had been bribed to refer business to another estate agency.

Holly was a real estate agent.  She was amazed to find that her Sales Director and other colleagues used various “deal-closing techniques” on prospective clients.  The most effective technique was what they called “the other party”.

Pushing the potential buyer for a decision, Holly’s colleagues would create a “buy-now-or-never” atmosphere by all means.  The colleagues would misinterpret the availability of the property concerned by saying that it was also viewed by many interested buyers of other colleagues.  In front of the potential buyer, they also either pretended to make lots of enquiries or engaged in a heated debates with other colleagues about the availability of the property.  The purpose was to increase the purchase desire as well as to impose pressure on the potential buyer.

According to Holly’s boss Mark, it was a real estate agent’s job to "help the potential buyer with a purchase decision".  Holly had her scruples and disagreed with such psychological manipulation.  However, after six months, she found herself lagging behind in terms of sales figures.  Mark remarked that Holly lacked ‘sales techniques’.

Should Holly also adopt the psychological manipulation that her colleagues had found so successful?   Or should she try to close deals in her own way, and be upfront and honest with her clients?

Ken was a branch manager of a local bank who was always keen for promotion. Unfortunately, he had been stuck in the same position in the bank for nearly ten years while his peers had all been promoted to senior positions. Recently, a nearby private housing development was opened for sale and had prompted the branch to initiate a marketing plan to attract new buyers. Ken's brother-in-law, Philip, was a property agent who was also trying to find business opportunities here.

During a family gathering, Ken told Philip that his boss was considering his promotion and added that it would be a great boost to his prospects if he was able to secure a substantial market share of the mortgage loans on the estate. Ken also emphasised how difficult such a task was in the face of intense competition with other banks.  On hearing this, Philip agreed to help Ken by referring his potential clients to apply for mortgage loans in Ken's branch. As a token of thanks, Ken proposed to offer Philip commissions.

Mr To, a manager of a listed company, was responsible for acquiring properties for his company which engaged in property redevelopment. Through his work, Mr To became acquainted with an estate agent Tony who frequently treated Mr To lavish dinners and unconditionally lent him $50,000 to solve his financial difficulties.

One night when they were having dinner, Mr To told Tony some confidential information about the acquisition plan of his listed company. As a token of his gratitude, Tony deposited $100,000 into Mr To’s bank account. Upon receiving the confidential information, Tony immediately arranged for his friends and relatives to rent and buy the premises that were to be acquired soon. Before long, the listed company announced its acquisition plan covering the premises acquired by Tony’s friends. Tony’s friends were granted compensation which were then shared among Tony and his friends.  Tony’s scam eventually surfaced and the listed company stopped processing all compensation applications made by Tony’s friends.

Mr Kwok, a manager of a listed company, was responsible for the company’s investment in the property market, in which several ten million dollars was usually involved.  Mr Kwok commissioned two estate agents Raymond and Freddy from two different estate agencies to source suitable properties for his company.  He always told Raymond and Freddy that there were many estate agents approaching him for business.  Facing fierce competition, Raymond and Freddy offered an ‘under-the-table’ commission of $520,000 and $1.7 million respectively to Mr Kwok for recommending the listed company to buy their properties.

When the listed company discovered that corruption might be involved in various property investment transactions which Mr Kwok handled, the company reported it to the ICAC.

A listed company exclusively authorised an estate agency to sell a factory building unit by tender. Estate agency manager Mr Chan and his subordinate Jenny were responsible for tender matters. Jenny soon found a client, Mr Lai, who was willing to pay $19.6 million for the unit.

Meanwhile, Sidney, the proprietor of a small estate agency, was facing intense competition and trying every means to gain business.  Knowing that Mr Chan was responsible for the factory unit transaction, Sidney spared no effort in looking for a buyer. He also offered a $100,000 “lai see” to Mr Chan and Jenny to ensure that his client could successfully buy the property. In light of the advantage offered by Sidney and upon Mr Chan’s instructions, Jenny deliberately misled other prospective tenderers, including Mr Lai, into lowering their tender price or withdrawing. ICAC officers later arrested Sidney and Mr Chan in a restaurant where they were discussing how to hand over the bribe. Initially, Sidney denied making a corrupt deal with Mr Chan, but Mr Chan chose to co-operate with the ICAC and revealed everything.